Introduction

Content
- Introduction
- The Kazbek C3 System
- C2 systems in the NSNF
- VLF transmission sites
- Transmission skeds and message formats
- Callsigns and their allocation
- Mistery Networks


On VLF (Very Large Frequencies) broadcasts in FSK Morse Code and T-600 mode may be received 7 days a week and 24 h a day. Following a complex sked all or parts of the messages are transmitted in parallel on a variety of frequencies between 3 and 23 MHz.
Command of this network is VGK, the General Staff in Moscow, which apparently make use of VLF Time Signal transmitters in Russia and some other CIS members for Command and Control of the SNF (Strategic Nuclear Forces). As the Navy is an important part of SNF, we are looking for interactions between the VGK transmissions and Navy units. All T-600 messages are encrypted and we can't monitor all relevant Navy frequencies for transmission acknowledgements, thus the following pages only can describe some keyhole views, as well as many speculations !, of a very interesting part of CIS Navy communications.
The most important callsign used by VGK is RDL, which means "to all units concerned". Since many years the callsign RGT77 can be heard on HF and in Morse Code only with broadcasts and xxx messages. Only callsign RGT77 appears, which imply this is, like RDL, the addressee not the sender. Several sources suggest this is the counterpart of RDL, operated by the General Staff of another branch with its office in Moscow. Operation times are very sporadic, frequencies constantly change, try these: 3161, 6438, 14092, 7050, 11408.5 and - unfortunately - many others.

See here for other C3 systems and equipment of CIS Navy: C3 Systems of the CIS Navy.

The Kazbek C3 System

This description is based on public information of NTI.org, Eugene Miasnikow, Pavel Podvig, Wikipedia and Russian Newspapers and was fully valid until 1999. Great parts of Kazbek - or a successor system ? - today (2008) still are in use.

The former Sovjet Union developed Kazbek, an elaborate C3 system (Command, Control and Communication), thus enabling the country's leadership to respond in a timely fashion to crisis situations. In a nuclear crisis, Kazbek would be activated upon the General Staff's VGK (Verkhofnoe Glavno Komandovanie) receipt of a missile attack warning sent from SPRN (Sistema Preduprezhdeniya o Raketnom Napadenii) Missile Attack Early Warning System or SKKP (Sistema Kontrolia Kosmicheskogo Prostranstva) Space Monitoring System. Predicted trajectories and targets would be diplayed on Krokus terminals in high ranking command posts. The commander-in-chief then would issue a "preliminary command" bringing strategic forces to full readiness. Launch orders cannot be issued prior to the preliminary command. If the commander-in-chief is not located at one of the command posts, he would use Cheget portable terminal equipment. The actual launch orders always were issued to the strategic forces using multiple communication channels.
An emergency backup system, Perimetr, would enable the General Staff to bypass all SRF (Strategic Rocket Forces) command post and directly connect them to the ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) launch stations.
Beside this LOW (Launch On Warning) doctrine, Kazbek C3 did not preclude a First Strike scenery, which is not described here.

It is believed that, after the desintegration of the USSR, Russias early warning systems were not as robust as they were before. There has been deterioration in the system since. Less satellites and radar stations were operational and led to dangerous incidents, but the main system at least twice could prevent any accidental launch. It is not obvious, how reliable early warning messages are today (2008).


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C2 Systems in the NSNF

Control of strategic submarines on duty is conducted by the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces through the Navy's Main Staff with the help of all continously working communication centers. The control system of the NSFN (Naval Strategic Nuclear Forces) unites all the different communication channels. As a rule, all elements of the system are interconnected by cables as well.

The safe transmission of launch order signals to SSBNs on duty is guaranteed by transmitting on ELF, on not less than 2 VLF channels, 5 HF channels and 5 satellite links. Transmissions are continous within the agreed sked of communication with the SSBN.
The subs may receive (only) commands on ELF via the ZEVS transmitter on the Kola peninsula even in depths of 200...300 m all over the globe. The transmission speed of ELF on several tens of Hertz is very low, hence the commands must be short. These commands therefore are designated ahead of time by a fixed code. In peacetime the ELF channel continously transmits the code for "normal situation".
VLFsignals may penetrate water only down to 20...30 m, unless a floating antenna is used. To ensure reception in wide parts of the oceans 5 VLF stations permanently were working on USSR territory near Molodechno, Nizhny Novgorod, Tashkent, Krasnodar and Khabarovsk. The situation today (2008) is described later. VLF channels transmit general commands, combat control messages and any accompanying informations. In peacetime routine messages are sent following certain skeds. Mobile coastal and aviation VLF stations would come in use, if the enemy had damaged stationary transmitters. One example is the TU-142RT, an aircraft with an antenna of several kilometers length.
The network for HF is the most diversified including a multitude of mobile, stationary and relay radio stations. To receive HF/VHF/UHF signals from ground stations or satellite, the submarine uses a floating towed antenna or rise to periscope depth and deploy a telescopic antenna.

It is not clear, which technical means of the Sovjet Unions two-ways C2 system today (still) are in use. Signal-A system consists of several communication tracks like radio, cable, satellite. The subsystem V'yuga adds to this redundancy by using HF, VLF and satellite links. All command posts down to regimental level are said to be equipped with V'yuga receivers. Signal-A and V'yuga are interfaced and can be used simultaneously. 1999 Russia for the first time officially recognized the existence of the Perimetr backup system. Perimetr would withstand the conditions of ESW (Electronic Shock Wave) in a nuclear war. The system would under LAU (Launch Under Attack) conditions physically bypass all Signal-A channels to directly transmit an order from VGK to the ICBM launchers (and, I assume, to the SSBNs). Perimetr is not based on electromagnetic communication channels, but would use rockets to transport messages to the launch sites (acc. to Pavel Podvig).


Only transmissions on VLF and HF can be monitored on a regular base and with reasonable expenditure. The VLF transmissions are the only link between General Staff and submarines, which partly (Morse Code) can be decoded. Furthermore it permanently can be received on parallel HF channels in cases, where remote VLF transmitters temporarely prevent reception on VLF. I therefore will describe more in detail these tranmissions.

VLF Transmission Sites

In 2008 VGK's VLF network consists of 6 transmitters, which are described more in detail here. These stations seem to be involved into the Signal-A/V'yuga System. Sincere thanks to Rimantas Pleikys for his corrections and amendments.

Location/purpose	Operated by	Call Sign
Vileyka/Molodechno (BLR), mostly time/phase synchronisation signal. Maybe modernization is ahead (or closure...). Location is 54N27.8 26E46.7.	31st Communications Hub, radio station nr. 43, nicknamed "Antey", military unit 49390.	RJH69
Kara Balta/Chaldovar (KGZ), time/phase synchronization signal and VGK tfc. Location is 43N1.9 73E36.8.	338th Communications Hub, nicknamed "Marevo".	RJH66
Khabarovsk Vladimirovka (RUS), time/phase synchronization signal and VGK tfc. Location is 48N29.1 134E49.2.		RAB99
Martanskaya, Krasnodar area (RUS), time/phase synchronization signal and VGK tfc. Station has been modernized with solid state transmitters. Location is 44N46.4 39E32.8.		RJH63
Druzhny/Nizhniy Novgorod (RUS), time/phase synchronisation signals and VGK tfc. Station has been modernized with solid state transmitters. This is German "Goliath" from WWII. Location at 56N10.4 43E56.	270th Communication Hub, nickname "Golyaf-2MK", military unit 36206	RJH99
Arkhangelsk (RUS), time/phase synchronization signal and VGK tfc. Location is 64N21.6 42E23.7.		RJH77

Specifications and pictures of the transmission sites:

RJH69, 3 insulated, central masts 320 m, 15 grounded, outer masts 270 m.	RJH66, 3 central, insulated, radiating masts, 15 grounded masts.	RJH63, 7 masts, central insulated radiator and 6 outer, grounded masts.	RJH99, 3 central, insulated, radiating masts, 15 grounded masts. This in fact is the German built "Goliath" transmitter, which has been dismantled and rebuilt here.	RJH77, 3 central, radiating, insulated masts, 15 grounded masts.	RAB99, a different array with 18 masts.
Vileyka Molodechno (BLR). Pictures show Transmitter site, power amplifier, control room, antenna tuning stage and antenna detail.	Bishkek, Chaldovar (KGZ)	Martanskaya, Krasnodar (RUS).	Druzhny, N. Novgorod (RUS).	Vozhdorma, Arkhangelsk (RUS)	Vladimirovska, Khabarovsk (RUS)
	RJH66 receiving station "Kaktus" at 43N5 74E8.4, a huge site with several Beverage arrays and many other antennas for VLF to HF.

Transmission skeds and message formats

All transmitters are active 24/7. Their estimated power is 1'000 kW (EIRP 30...50 kW). The frequencies in use are 18,1 - 20,5 - 23,0 - 25,0 - 25,1 and 25,5 kHz. 18,1 kHz is only used for VGK transmissions in FSK Morse Code or BEE 36/50 mode.
Only one VLF station is on the air at any time, the schedule being unknown. Any single station can be used at any time slot.
All other frequencies in turn are used for dissemination of time/phase synchronization signals, the schedule of RJH63 being different from the other transmitters. Although these time signals are of great importance to submarines, the sked is not given here, as they do not contain information.

A multitude of HF channels parallel to 18,1 kHz allow monitoring the network on higher frequencies too. At least some of the HF transmitters probably are co-located at the 6 VLF transmitters. HF channels constantly change, I haven't found a sked so far. These frequencies may be worth to listen to: 14411, 14664, 10535, 7657, 6342, 5438 kHz.

There may be, however, BEE 36/50 traffic on other frequencies, which do not belong to Signal-A, or they belong to Signal-A, but are not parallel to VLF. Furthermore HF channels do not always send all VLF messages, certain BEE 36/50 and Morse Code messages are omitted.

Short BEE 36/50 messages normally are sent at h+08 and h+28, long BEE 36/50 messages are sent at h+48. Transmissions at h+18, h+38 and h+58 are possible as well.
Short and long Morse messages as well as Morse xxx messages can be sent any time. xxx flash messages nearly always are disseminated in batches, spaced only a few minutes. Trafficload varies much from day to day, exceptions in the sked are always possible.

The following message formats have been observed so far:

- short routine message BEE 36/50 mode
- long message BEE 36/50 mode, sometimes preceded with „xxx xxx„ in Morse code
- short routine messages Morse code, containing a callsign and 2 5FG (repeated twice).
- long messages Morse code, many 5FG, some with decode key and final group containing day/group count.
- xxx Strategic Flash Messages in Morse code. See as well XXX Strategic Flash Messages .

BEE 36/50 is a synchronous FSK mode with 200 Hz shift, which starts idling with 36 Baud and than switches to 50 Baud for synchronization and message. All tfc is encrypted, HOKA states, there is a 5-repetition cycle. Besides the T-600 modem other equipment might be in use today as well.BEE 36/50 transmissions start with a synch string and are regularly re-synchronized. So far VLF and HF transmissions used the same synch strings.

Short routine messages are made up of 3 individual messages, which are repeated during the same day. Next day another text is repeated. There are exceptions.
Long messages normally start immediately after the h+48 routine message and a 1 min "010101..." 36 Bd idle period. They too are made up of 3 individual messages, which are not repeated. They all are of the same length and end at h+55, but 6 messages are possible as well.
Long xxx messages are sent any time, again the same text is sent 3 times.

Morse code messages may be handsent or automatic. xxx messages are handsent. Possible op errors so far observed were: wrong text, wrong message, tipos. All messages end with "k", but an acknowledgement of the counterpart never has been heard - obviously other channels are used.
Morse - and BEE 36/50 messages may start with "uuuuu", the number of letters can vary. The meaning is not clear, in the USSR Forces it simply said: "Transmission in your direction starts now." On the other hand "bbbbb" was: "Transmission in my direction starts now."

Callsigns and their allocation

For obvious reasons only Morse code transmissions have been analysed for their content.
The messages do not contain a preambel, just one or more addressees and the text - there is no "de". This makes sense, if we assume, that in Kazbek /Signal-2 the sender always is VGK Navy's Main Staff.

Short routine messages and long messages are sent to RDL, Strategic Flash Messages to RDL or to RDL and RKS. Three letters mean collective callsigns - e.g. a fleet or a formation of units. RDL seems to mean "all units concerned", other call signs heard are REO and RMP.
In March REU showed up and is used regularly since then - seems it replaced at least partly RDL and RKS. We'll see...

Mistery Networks

There are a few HF stations, active since many years, of unknown purpose, which often have been connected with the Russian Strategic Forces Advance Warning System:

- "The Buzzer" on 4625 kHz, Audio File: s28buzzer2.wav [672 KB]
- "The Squeaky Wheel" on 3829 kHz, Audio File: s32squeakywheel1.wav [680 KB]
- "The Pip" on 3757 kHz night/5448 kHz day, Audio File: s30pip.wav [629 KB]

All transmitters are constantly on the air and behave like channel markers. But in very rare cases short voice messages in Russian or even some data bits can be heard. Because of this very low level of information disseminated, it has been suggested the stations act like a Dead Man's Switch: if you don't hear my signal, something is wrong/something is going to happen. Short voice messages may check readiness of the station's crew. So far that remains speculation, as there are no confirmed findings.
Even if we consider the fact, that such simple systems may take us by surprise, it is hard to believe, that they are of decisive importance to the Strategic Forces.

There is more information available on the Web about position, technical specifications and traffic of the stations. Googling for example with "The Buzzer's" callsign UVB-76 will give some data and pictures about the transmitter in Pogarovo RUS.

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